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Abstract—Safety risk assessment is an essential process to
ensure a dependable Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) design.
Traditional risk assessment considers only physical failures. For
modern CPS, failures caused by cyberattacks are on the rise.
The focus of latest research effort is on safety-security lifecycle
integration and the expansion of modeling formalism for risk as-
sessment to incorporate security failures. The interaction between
safety and security and its impact on the overall system design,
as well as the reliability loss resulting from ignoring security
failures are some of the overlooked research questions. This
paper addresses these research questions by presenting a new
safety design method named Cyber Layer Of Protection Analysis
(CLOPA) that extends existing LOPA framework to include
failures caused by cyberattacks. The proposed method provides a
rigorous mathematical formulation that expresses quantitatively
the tradeoff between designing a highly-reliable versus a highly-
secure CPS. We further propose a co-design lifecycle process
that integrates the safety and security risk assessment processes.
We evaluate the proposed CLOPA approach and the integrated
lifecycle on a practical case study of a process reactor controlled
by an industrial control testbed, and provide a comparison
between the proposed CLOPA and current LOPA risk assessment
practice.
Index Terms—Cyber Physical System, CPS, Security, IEC
61511, NIST SP 800-30, SCADA, LOPA, Safety Instrumented
System, Safety Integrity Level, Risk Assessment, HAZOP.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cyber physical system (CPS) is an integration of a
physical process with computation and networking required
for physical system monitoring and control. The integration of
process dynamics with those of computation and networking
brings a plethora of engineering challenges. As the majority
of CPS are deployed in mission-critical applications, the
dependability and resilience to failures is a key design property
for modern CPS.
To ensure a given CPS is dependable, a risk assessment
is carried out both at design time and operation time. The
risk assessment process highlights the system weaknesses
and helps defining the safety requirements that need to be
met to achieve the target reliability measures. The classical
approach to perform the risk assessment is to consider physical
failures only. As state of the art CPS designs move to open
source hardware and software, cyberattacks became a source
of failure that cannot be ignored.
Realizing the critical nature of CPS cyberattacks and their
impact on the safety of people and environment, as well as the
potential catastrophic financial losses, the research community
developed several approaches to integrate security aspects into
the risk assessment process. This integration has been done
mainly by extending the reliability modeling formalism to
incorporate security-related risks.
As the research effort focused on how to integrate safety
and security, one of the overlooked research questions is how
safety and security interact with each other and how would
this impacts the overall system design. Putting this research
question in a different format: Is there a trade-off between
designing a highly reliable and a highly secure system? A
related research question is: If we ignore the cybersecurity
attacks in the design process, what is the impact on the overall
system reliability? Is the reliability gain worth the complexity
introduced by integrating security both at design and run-
time? A followup research question is: Under what conditions
can we ignore security failures?
In order to better understand the interaction between safety
and security in the system design process, we consider in
this paper the safety risk assessment process for a given
system and study the impact of overlooking failures caused
by cyberattacks. We refer to such failures as security failures
in the rest of the paper. By formally introducing the failures
caused by attacks into the risk assessment process, we can
define the reliability requirements for the cyber components
of the system as a function of both the failure rate of physical
components and the resilience to cyberattacks. This formal
requirements specification enables us to understand the design
trade-off between higher reliability of physical components vs
higher resilience of the cyber component, and the sensitivity
of the overall system performance to both types of failures. In
addition, we can gain insight into the interplay between safety
and security and how to integrate both lifecycles during the
design process.
More precisely, we consider the Layer Of Protection Anal-
ysis (LOPA), a widely adopted risk assessment method that
follows a hazard identification study, such as Hazard and
Operability (HAZOP). LOPA is carried out to identify whether
an additional Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is needed
for specific hazardous scenarios to achieve the target risk
level. As modern SIS is typically an embedded device, it has
both physical and security failure modes. We mathematically
derive the SIS design constraints in terms of both physical
and security failure probabilities. Additionally, we propose an
integrated safety-security design process that shows the flow
of information between both lifecycles.
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2II. RELATED WORK
HAZOP has been the dominant risk assessment method
for the process industry for over 30 years [1]–[3]. LOPA
has been used in conjunction with HAZOP to design Safety
Instrumented Systems (SIS) and specify the Safety Integrity
Level (SIL) for each Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) [4].
Because of the wide adoption of LOPA by industry due
to its systematic approach and quantitative risk assessment
capability, LOPA has been included as one of the methods in
IEC 61511-3 standard with several illustrating examples [5].
The LOPA approach has been applied to physical security risk
analysis in [6]. However, to the best of author’s knowledge,
there is no research work on integrating security attacks in the
LOPA framework for safety instrumented systems design.
There are emergent standardization initiatives to address
safety and security coordination in cyber physical systems.
IEC 62443-4-1 (Security for industrial automation and control
systems - Part 4-1: Secure product development lifecycle
requirements) is a standard developed by ISA-99 committee
with the purpose to extend existing safety lifecycle at different
phases to include security aspects to ensure safe CPS design
[7]. IEC TC65 AHG1 is a recently formed group linked
to the same technical committee developing IEC 61508 and
IEC 62443 to consider how to bridge functional safety and
cybersecurity for industrial automation systems [8]. IEC 62859
(Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems
- Requirements for coordinating safety and cybersecurity) is
a standard derived from IEC 62645 for the nuclear power
industry to coordinate the design and operation efforts with
respect to safety and cybersecurity [9]. DO-326 (Airworthiness
Security Process Specification) is a standard for the avionics
industry that augments existing guidelines for aircraft certifica-
tion to include the threat of intentional unauthorized electronic
interaction to aircraft safety [10].
We can classify the research work on combining safety
and security for CPS into two broad categories that try
to answer the following research questions: (1) Given the
independent safety and security lifecycles, what are the simi-
larities/differences and how could the two lifecycles be aligned
or unified? This research direction usually focuses on answer-
ing the question ”what to do”, rather than ”how to do it”,
(2) For a given CPS, how can we carry out risk assessment
(qualitative/quantitative) that considers both physical failures
and cyberattacks? Consequently, how can we unify the process
of safety and security requirements definition and verification?
This research direction focuses on common modeling tech-
niques that can incorporate both safety and security failures,
and often extends model-based engineering body of knowledge
and tools to incorporate security requirements in the design
process. In the following, we survey the main results for each
research direction. A more thorough survey is presented in
[11].
a) Lifecycle Integration.: The authors in [12] use fault
tree analysis to combine both safety and security failures
in one unified risk assessment framework for the aviation
industry. The outcome of the risk assessment is used to
define both safety and security requirements. A roadmap for
cybersafety engineering to increase air traffic management
system resilience against cyberattacks is proposed in [13]. The
V-shaped model to develop embedded software for CPS is
augmented with security actions in [14]. The integration of
IEC 61508 safety standard and IEC 15408 for IT security
is described in [15]–[17] for building automation systems.
The author in [18] describes in more details the integration
of IEC 61508 safety lifecycle and the CORAS approach
to identify security risks [19]. An approach to align safety
and security during different stages of system development
lifecycle is proposed in [20]. The approach, called Lifecycle
Attribute Alignment, ensures compatibility between safety and
security controls developed and maintained during the system
development lifecycle. HAZOP, a predominantly used method
for safety risk assessment in the process industry, is modified
in [21] to include security failures. The authors introduce new
guide words, attributes, and modifiers for security components
akin to traditional HAZOP limited to safety failures. Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is extended in [22] to
include security vulnerabilities, suggesting the name Failure
Mode Vulnerability and Effect Analysis (FMVEA).
b) Model-Based Risk Assessment: Several graphical
methods have been used to combine safety and security anal-
ysis. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is a graphical notation
used to model requirements, goals, claims, and evidence of
safety arguments [23]. The SafSec research project for the
avionics industry elaborate on the use of GSN to integrate
both safety and security arguments in one representation [24].
A similar approach is used in [25] where authors apply the
Non Functional Requirement (NFR) approach to quantitatively
assess the safety and security properties of an oil pipeline
CPS. NFR is a technique that allows simultaneous safety
and security graphical representation and evaluation at the
architectural level.
The simplicity and wide adoption of fault and attack trees
promoted the research work to merge both modeling tools.
The integration of fault trees and attack trees is considered
in [26] in order to extend traditional risk analysis to in-
clude cyberattack risks. A quantitative analysis is proposed
by assigning probabilities to tree events. Similarly, fault tree
analysis is used in [27] to analyze safety/security risks in
aviation software. In [28], the authors extend Component
Fault Trees (CFT) to contain both safety and security events.
Both qualitative and quantitative analysis is performed to
assess the overall risk. The quantitative analysis is enabled
by assigning probabilities to safety events and categorical
rating (low, medium, high) for security events. The authors
in [29] translate the combined fault-attack tree into stochastic
time automata to enable quantitative risk analysis. The use of
Bowtie diagrams and analysis in place of fault trees is reported
in [30], where it is integrated with attack trees for combined
safety-security risk assessment.
Given the limited semantics of fault trees, Boolean logic
Driven Markov Process (BDMP) graphical formalism intro-
duced in [31] has been used to integrate safety and secu-
rity events. The approach integrates fault trees with Markov
process at the leaf nodes level and associates a mean time
to success (MTTS) for security events and a mean time to
3failure (MTTF) for safety events. This allows both a qualitative
and a quantitative risk assessment for the given system. The
formalism also enables the modeling of detection and response
mechanisms without a need for model change. The work in
[32] applies BDMP formalism to a pipeline case study, illus-
trating different types of safety-security inter-dependencies. In
[33], Stuxnet attack is modeled using BDMP and a quantitative
risk analysis is carried out on the industrial control system.
Petri nets have also been proposed to overcome the limi-
tations of fault trees. A formalism for safety analysis named
State/Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) is reported in [34]. In this
formalism, both deterministic state machines and Markov
chains are combined, while keeping the visualisation of causal
chains known from fault trees. This formalism is extended in
[35] to include an attacker model to deal with both safety
and security. Similarly, stochastic petri nets have been used in
[36] to model the impact of intrusion detection and response
on CPS reliability, and in [37] to assess the vulnerabilities in
SCADA systems. Bayesian belief networks are also considered
as one of the model-based approaches. In [38], a Bayesian
Belief Network is used to assess the combined safety and
security risk for an oil pipeline example.
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) commonly used
in software engineering has also been used for safety and
security risk assessment. Misuse cases for UML diagrams have
been used to define safety requirements in [39] and security
requirements in [40], independently. A combined process for
Harm Assessment of Safety and Security has been proposed
in [41] based on both UML and HAZOP studies. UMLsafe
[42] and UMLsec [43] are two UML extensions that enable
modeling of safety and security requirements, respectively.
The combined UMLsafe/UMLsec is proposed in [44] for
safety-security co-development. SysML-sec, a SysML-based
model driven engineering environment, is used in [45] for the
formal verification of safety and security properties.
System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) was developed
as a new hazard analysis technique to evaluate the safety of a
system [46]. The authors in [47] extend the STPA to include
system security aspects in the analysis. The expanded approach
is named STPA-SafeSec and demonstrated on a use case in the
power grid domain.
c) Our Contribution: The work presented in this paper
addresses both research directions with a new approach. First,
we integrate both safety and security lifecycles, based on a
rigorous mathematical formulation that shows the coupling and
interaction between both lifecycles. Therefore, our integrated
model is a natural consequence of the mathematical analysis.
This is in contrast to existing research work that integrates
both lifecycles based on similarities and differences between
activities as well as intuition. In addition, we do not treat
the security lifecycle independently from the physical system.
Rather, we identify the security vulnerabilities of the cyber
system by their impact on the physical system. This ”back-
ward” approach is not proposed in the context of lifecycle
integration, although it is addressed in some of the model-
based approaches referenced above. Second, we integrate the
safety and security requirements in the context of HAZOP
and LOPA risk assessment methods, showing mathematically
the interaction between safety and security and the tradeoff
in designing both systems. To the best of authors’ knowledge,
existing research work on model-based approaches to integrate
safety and security focuses on how to incorporate security
vulnerabilities in the context of risk assessment, but does not
show their interaction or how to design a cyber system that
can achieve both requirements. Third, our work focuses on
system design driven by model-based risk assessment. Existing
research work focuses mainly on the risk assessment phase,
falling short on showing how the design phase is carried
out using the outcome of the combined safety-security risk
assessment. Fourth, research work on quantitative risk as-
sessment for model-based approaches shows how to calculate
system reliability figures in terms of model parameters, but
does not show mathematically how safety and security interact
in the model to affect the overall system reliability. Finally,
our work presents a clear method to carry out a combined
risk assessment using LOPA, a practical approach that is
extensively used in industry, giving the approach merit for
industrial implementation.
In summary, our contributions are the answers to the afore-
mentioned research questions, and could be summarized as
follows: (1) We propose a new mathematical formulation for
LOPA that captures the interaction and tradeoff between safety
and security in system design, (2) we show quantitatively
the loss in reliability if security failures are ignored, (3) we
show the design region in terms of safety and security failure
likelihoods, answering the question of whether we can ignore
security failures, (4) finally, as an outcome, we propose an
integrated safety-security lifecycle that is based on a rigorous
mathematical formulation.
The work in this paper is an elaboration on our initial idea
about LOPA with cyberattacks proposed in [48]. The work
here presents an expanded concrete mathematical treatment of
the subject, an integrated safety-security lifecycle architecture
and design algorithm, and a detailed process control case study
to illustrate the design method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section III
explains the safety and security risk assessment processes,
including IEC 61511 safety lifeycle and the LOPA method,
cybersecurity risk assessment, and illustrates the cyber de-
pendence between control and safety systems. Section III-B
illustrates the dependence between control and safety systems
in modern CPS architectures. Section IV proposes a new
LOPA mathematical formulation that incorporates failures due
to cyberattacks. Section V proposes an integrated safety-
security lifecycle process. Section VI presents a case study for
a chemical reactor overflow hazard that compares the classical
LOPA approach with the proposed formulation. The work is
concluded in section VII.
III. SAFETY AND SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
A. IEC 61511 Safety Lifecycle Process
Figure 1 shows the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) design
lifecycle according to IEC 61511 standard [5]. The design
starts with Hazard & Risk assessment, where systems hazards
are identified. HAzard and OPerability (HAZOP) study, What
4Hazard and risk assessment
Clause 8 1
Allocation of safety functions to protection layers
Clause 9 2
Safety requirements spec. for the SIS
Clauses 10, 12 3
Design and engineering of SIS
Clauses 11, 12 4
SIS installation, commissioning, validation
Clause 14, 15 5
Operation and maintenance
Clause 16 6
SIS modifications
Clause 17 7
Decommissioning
Clause 18 8
Fig. 1: IEC 61511 SIS design lifecycle (adopted from [5])
If analysis, and Fault Tree analysis are the most common
methods at this stage [1]. The risk assessment phase ranks each
identified risk according to its likelihood and consequence,
either quantitatively or qualitatively, and associates a risk
ranking for each hazard.
The resulting list of hazards and associated risk ranking is
used as an input to the second phase focused on the allocation
of safety functions to protection layers. This phase deals
only with hazards that exceed a threshold risk rank that an
organization is willing to accept. For each hazardous scenario,
there is a Target Mitigated Event Likelihood (TMEL) measure
that is defined based on the risk rank. The purpose of this phase
is to check if the TMEL is met with existing protection layers.
If not, an additional protection layer is recommended, often
in the form of a new Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) with
a predefined Safety Integrity Level (SIL) to cover the gap to
the TMEL. Risk Matrix, Risk Graph, and Layer Of Protection
Analysis (LOPA) are the most commonly used methods in this
phase [49].
The third phase is the development of the Safety Require-
ments Specification (SRS), which documents all the functional
and timing requirements for each SIF. The fourth phase is the
detailed design and engineering. Phases 5 to 8 are concerned
with system installation and commissioning, operation, modi-
fication, and decommissioning.
Phase 2 is where the CPS control and safety systems
are considered in the risk assessment process. Therefore, we
study this phase in depth in this paper. Since LOPA is the
predominant approach for this phase, we limit our discussion
to LOPA methodology. Other approaches could be adopted in
a similar way.
The underlying assumption in LOPA analysis is that all
protection layers, including the new SIF, are independent. This
means that any failure of any protection layer is independent
of the failure of other protection layers. In other words, if one
layer failed, this does not increase or decrease the likelihood
of failure of the other layers. This assumption simplifies the
mathematical analysis significantly, as it allows the multipli-
cation of individual probabilities to obtain the required joint
probability. The simplicity of LOPA calculations is probably
one of the key reasons behind its widespread adoption by
industry. Unfortunately, when cybersecurity is considered as a
potential failure in LOPA analysis, the independence assump-
tion between the control and safety systems no longer holds,
as explained in the next section.
B. Control and Safety Systems Cyber Dependence
Each of the control and safety systems has two modes of
failure; BPCS physical failures, Bp, BPCS security failure,
Bc, SIS physical failure, Sp, and SIS security failure Sc. For
physical failures, IEC 61511 standard strongly recommends
complete separation between the control and safety systems
of any plant. This separation includes sensors, computing
devices, as well as final elements such as valves and motors.
Separation also includes any common utility such as power
supplies. The industry adopted this separation principle, hence
BPCS and SIS physical failures could be accurately assumed
to be independent, i.e., P [Bp, Sp] = P [Bp]P [Sp].
One exception to the separation between BPCS and SIS
is the cyber communication link between the control and
safety systems. Figure 2 is a snapshot of a typical industrial
control system architecture showing the communication link
between the BPCS and SIS. BPCS-SIS communication could
be over the control LAN or via a dedicated point to point
serial link. The communication protocol is typically an open
standard such as Modbus or DNP3 [50], [51]. This type
of communication exists in many industrial installations to
exchange plant data as the data from field devices connected
to the safety system is not accessible from the BPCS and vice
versa.
Given this architecture, we can define two attack vectors for
SIS compromise: (1) a direct attack that exploits an existing
controller vulnerability could be launched against the SIS
node. This could be via any node on the control LAN or
using Man In The Middle (MITM) attack that exploits the
BPCS-SIS communication. We designate this attack event by
AS in Figure 2, and (2) by compromising the BPCS first
then exploiting the BPCS-SIS link to compromise the SIS. We
designate this attack by the sequence of events AB and ABS in
Figure 2. Further, we designate the attack event from the SIS
to the BPCS by ASB . The attack sequence AB → ABS may
be easier if the SIS is highly secured such that direct attack
may be infeasible. This is particularly true if we consider the
fact that the BPCS is a trusted node to the SIS.
The above analysis shows a clear dependency between
the control and safety systems that violates the original
LOPA independence assumption. The security failures for
the BPCS and SIS are no longer independent due to the
data communication coupling. We can formulate the different
5Safety Instrumented 
System (SIS)
Basic Process Control 
System (BPCS)
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MITM Attack Direct Attack
AB
ASB
Fig. 2: A snapshot of an industrial control system architecture
showing BPCS-SIS connectivity and potential attack vectors.
security failure probabilities using basic probability laws as
in (1) to (3). It can be easily shown that if the BPCS-SIS
communication link does not exist, or fully secured, then
P [ASB ] = P [ABS ] = 0, and equation (3) reduces to the
independent case P [Sc, Bc] = P [Sc]P [Bc].
C. Cyber Security Risk Assessment
The calculation of the probability of cyberattacks AS , AB ,
and ABS could be performed during the cybersecurity risk
assessment process. This requires a detailed specification
of the BPCS and SIS and their connectivity, including the
embedded system hardware, operating system, running soft-
ware services, as well as the network connectivity. According
to NIST SP 800-30 standard, ”Guide for Conducting Risk
Assessments”, the cybersecurity lifecycle process stages are:
(1) asset identification, where the particular cyber components
and their criticality levels are identified, (2) vulnerability
identification, along with the associated threats and attack
vectors, (3) development of relevant attack trees for each
attack scenario identified, (4) penetration testing to validate
the vulnerability findings and attack scenarios and to help
estimating the effort and probability for individual attack steps
for each scenario, and (5) finally risk assessment to identify
the scenarios with unacceptable risk [52]. Figure 6, bottom
row, summarizes the cybersecurity lifecycle.
The calculation of the required BPCS and SIS probabilities
could be typically carried out with the aid of attack trees [53].
The attack tree enumerates all possible routes to compromise
the system, and each edge is assigned a probability represent-
ing the likelihood of the associated event. Using basic prob-
ability laws, the overall probability of a system compromise
could be calculated. Section VI presents an example of such
calculation.
IV. CLOPA: LOPA WITH SECURITY FAILURES
A. CLOPA Mathematical Formulation
A system hazard will take place if one or more of the
initiating events occur and all the associated protection layers
fail simultaneously. The main objective of LOPA is to calculate
the expected number of hazardous events per time interval and
compare it to the TMEL. The initiating event is typically mod-
eled in reliability engineering by a Poisson random variable
N with parameter λ arrivals per unit time. If we designate
the Bernoulli random variable representing the simultaneous
failure of protection layers by L with success probability p,
and the random variable representing the number of hazards
per time interval by H , then we have:
H =
N∑
i=1
Li (4)
Therefore, for a given N , H is binomially-distributed with
expected value:
E[H] =
∞∑
N=0
E[H|N ]P [N ] = p
∞∑
N=0
NP [N ] = pλ (5)
Equation (5) is the underlying mathematical concept behind
LOPA analysis. Essentially, for each initiating event, the
likelihood λ is estimated from field data, and the probability
of simultaneous failure of all protection layers is specified.
Finally, the expected number of hazards per unit time, E[H],
considering all initiating events, is estimated and compared
to the pre-specified TMEL. If E[H] > TMEL, then a safety
instrumented system is required with a probability of failure
on demand P [Sp] (or equivalently a Risk Reduction Factor
RRF = 1/P [Sp]) that achieves E[H] ≤ TMEL.
In order to express the LOPA formula in (5) in terms
of all protection layers, including the BPCS and SIS, we
introduce some mathematical notation. We designate the set
of initiating events for a given hazardous scenario by I =
{I1, I2, . . . , In, Bp, Bc}, where n is the number of possible
initiating events excluding BPCS failures, Bp denotes BPCS
physical fault failure event, and Bc denotes BPCS security
failure event. We express the associated set of event likelihoods
by Λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, λp, λc}. Further, we denote the set of
all possible protection layers by L = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm}, where
m is the number of existing protection layers, excluding the
BPCS, denoted by B, and the SIS, denoted by S. For each
initiating event Ii ∈ I, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, there is a subset of
protection layers Li ⊆ L that could stop the propagation of
a hazard from causing its consequences, in addition to the
protection layers B and S, i.e., the set of the protection layers
for the initiating cause Ii is Li ∪ {B,S}. Table I shows a
sample LOPA table using the introduced terminology.
With the introduced notation, the expected number of haz-
ards in (5), which should be less than the TMEL, could be
expanded as:
E[H] =P [S,B]
(
n∑
i=1
(λiP [Li]) + P [LB ]λc
)
+
P [S]P [LB ]λp ≤ TMEL (6)
6P [Bc] = P [AB ] + P [AS ]P [ASB ]− P [AB ]P [AS ]P [ASB ] (1)
P [Sc] = P [AS ] + P [AB ]P [ABS ]− P [AB ]P [AS ]P [ABS ] (2)
P [Sc, Bc] = P [AB ](P [AS ] + P [ABS ]) + P [AS ]P [ASB ]− P [AB ]P [AS ](P [ABS ] + P [ASB ]) (3)
Fig. 3: Security failure probabilities for the BPCS and SIS
where LB is the set of protection layers for BPCS physical or
security failure event, and we assume that all protection layers
are independent from the BPCS and SIS, while keeping the
dependence between the BPCS and SIS. In addition, higher or-
der probability terms resulting from multiple initiating events
are ignored due to their insignificance.
To calculate the joint failure probability P [S,B], we use
basic probability laws and the fact that the BPCS and SIS
have both physical and cyber modes of failure as explained in
Section III-B to obtain the expression in (11). Substituting (11)
in (6), we obtain the general LOPA equation in (7). We call
this expanded version of LOPA hereafter CLOPA, standing for
Cyber LOPA.
P [Sp] ≤ β − (α1P [Sc] + α2P [Sc, Bc])
α1 − α1P [Sc] + α2P [Bc]− α2P [Sc, Bc] (7)
where:
α1 = P [Bp]
(
n∑
i=1
(λiP [Li]) + P [LB ]λc
)
+ P [LB ]λp (8)
α2 = (1− P [Bp])
(
n∑
i=1
(λiP [Li]) + P [LB ]λc
)
(9)
β = TMEL (10)
In order to define the CLOPA formula in terms of the
actual design variables P [AS ] and P [ABS ] that represent the
probability of security failures of actual CPS components, we
substitute (1) - (3) into (7) to obtain:
P [Sp] ≤ β − γ1P [AS ]− γ2P [ABS ](1− P [AS ])
γ3 − γ3P [AS ]− γ2P [ABS ](1− P [AS ]) (12)
where:
γ1 = α1 + α2[P [AB ] + P [ASB ](1− P [AB ])] (13)
γ2 = (α1 + α2)P [AB ] (14)
γ3 = α1 + α2P [AB ] (15)
Initiating
Event
Likelihood
λi (/yr)
L1 . . . Lm BPCS
(B)
TMEL
I1 λ1 ← P [L1] → P [B] 10−x
. . . . . . . . .
In λn ← P [Ln] → P [B]
Bp λp ← P [LB ] → 1
Attack λc ← P [LB ] → P [B]
TABLE I: Sample LOPA Table. P [L] refers to the combined
probability of failure of protection layers applicable to the
initiating event from L1 to Lm.
Equation (12), along with (8) - (10) and (13) - (15), represent
the general CLOPA formulation to design the safety instru-
mented system. It represents an upper bound on the probability
of physical failure for the safety system in terms of the security
failure probabilities, showing clearly the coupling between
the safety system and security system design.The design
variables are the ones related to the safety system, namely,
P [Sp], P [AS ], and P [ABS ]. The rest are model parameters
that are predetermined, including the BPCS failure marginal
probabilities. This is because the BPCS design is independent
of the SIS design, and usually takes place earlier in the engi-
neering design cycle. Note that we assume here that P [ASB ]
is a known parameter. This is because by completely defining
the BPCS and its hardware and software specifications, the
probability of cyber attack could be estimated, even though the
SIS is not yet completely defined. Table VI in the appendix
summarizes the model variables and parameters.
It should be noted that with existing LOPA methodology, se-
curity failures are ignored, i.e., P [AB ] = P [AS ] = P [ABS ] =
P [ASB ] = 0. Substituting these zero equations in (12), we
obtain the classical LOPA formulation:
P [Sp] ≤ β
α1
=
TMEL
P [Bp]
∑n
i=1 (λiP [Li]) + P [LB ](λp + λc)
(16)
B. Design Space
Using the fact that P [Sp] ≥ 0 for a realizable safety system
in (12), we obtain:
γ1P [AS ] + γ2P [ABS ]− γ2P [AS ]P [ABS ] ≤ β (17)
Figure 4 shows the shaded region defined by the inequality
in (17). The boundary curve is defined by (17) when equality
holds:
P [ABS ] =
β
γ2
1−
(
γ1
β
)
P [AS ]
1− P [AS ]
 (18)
The first order derivative of the boundary curve is negative for
γ1/β > 1 and positive otherwise. Since γ1 > β to require a
safety system (proof is straightforward by inspecting equations
(8),(9), (13), and (16)), the boundary curve is concave as in
Figure (4b). We note that any point in the shaded region
results in a feasible SIS. Points on the boundary curve result
in P [Sp] = 0, or equivalently RRF → ∞. Points closer to
the boundary would have high values for the RRF, requiring a
very highly reliable SIS that may not be achievable in practice.
Points closer to the origin result in lower RRF. It can be easily
7P [S,B] = P [Sp] (P [Bp](1− P [Bc]− P [Sc]) + P [Bc]) + P [Sc]P [Bp] + P [Sc, Bc] (1− P [Sp]− P [Bp] + P [Sp]P [Bp])
(11)
Fig. 4: CLOPA Design Region
shown that the contour lines for (12), assuming the equality
holds, for P [Sp] = C could be expressed as:
P [ABS ] =
Cγ3 − β
γ2(C − 1)
1−
(
Cγ3−γ1
Cγ3−β
)
P [AS ]
1− P [AS ]
 (19)
The contour line that represents the design boundary in Figure
4 can be derived from (19) by setting C = 0.
We can extract several information from this graph: (1) the
maximum probability of security failure for the safety system
by directed attacks is β/γ1. This probability results in an
un-realizable safety system, as the required RRF → ∞.
(2) The maximum probability of security failure for the safety
system by pivot attack via the BPCS is β/γ2. Likewise, this
probability does not result in a realizable safety system. Finally
(3) The minimum value of RRF is achieved at the origin for a
perfectly secured safety system where P [AS ] = P [ABS ] = 0,
with RRF given by :
P [Sp]max =
β
γ3
, RRFmin =
γ3
β
(20)
Clearly, points outside the shaded region result in non-
realizable SIS. This result reemphasizes the interplay between
the safety and security systems of a cyber physical system.
The design space highlights the major difference between
LOPA and CLOPA. In LOPA, the SIS requirement is related
to reliability in the form of the required safety integrity level.
In CLOPA, an additional requirement for the SIS is its security
resilience, in the form of an upper bound on the probability
of a security failure (cyberattack success), either directly or
indirectly via the BPCS.
C. Classical LOPA Error
To obtain the error resulting from using classical LOPA, we
subtract (16) from (12) to obtain:
eRRF =
ζ1 + ζ2P [AS ] + ζ3P [ABS ](1− P [AS ])
β [β − γ1P [AS ]− γ2P [ABS ](1− P [AS ])] (21)
where:
ζ1 = β(γ3 − α1) = βα2P [AB ] (22)
ζ2 = α1γ1 − βγ3 (23)
ζ3 = γ2(α1 − β) (24)
The minimum error occurs for a perfectly secured safety
system, i.e., P [AS ] = P [ABS ] = 0:
min eRRF = P [AB ]
(
α2
β
)
= P [AB ](1− P [Bp])
n∑
i=1
(λiP [Li]) (25)
The error will be zero, i.e., classical LOPA result coincides
with CLOPA, if and only if the probability of BPCS security
failure via a direct attack is zero.
V. SAFETY-SECURITY CO-DESIGN
A. Design Process
The current industrial practice is to perform safety and
security risk assessments independently, treating the physical
and cyber components of a CPS as two separate entities.
As illustrated in section IV, accurate safety risk assessment
requires knowledge about the cyber components and their
security failure probabilities. As the required minimum level of
reliability from the safety system (precisely, the Risk Reduc-
tion Factor RRF), decreases by minimizing the security failure
probabilities, a straightforward approach is to specify the
minimum achievable cyber attack probabilities for the safety
system a priori then calculate the RRF required accordingly
as per (12). However, there are two issues with this approach:
(1) It is difficult to specify cyber attack probabilities for a
system that is not yet designed or completely specified. At
most, the proposed figures will be inaccurate. (2) Even if a
conservative approach is taken when specifying cyber attack
probabilities, these figures may change by the end of the safety
system design process. This is because the RRF of the safety
system mandates the hardware and software architecture of the
system, and the architecture consequently defines the cyber
attack surface and hence the cyber attack probabilities. After
the design is completed, it may be very well the case that the
system RRF is achieved, but the original cyber attack figures
have been violated, mandating a new value for RRF.
Figure 5 illustrates this design situation. Initially, a rea-
sonably achievable values for P [AS ] and RRFT are selected,
and the corresponding P [ABS ] value is calculated from the
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Fig. 5: Interdependence of Safety and Security designs.
CLOPA. Using the RRFT , the SIS design process is initiated,
and the complete system hardware and software architec-
tures are produced. The attack surface is then identified for
the produced architecture and the cyber attack probabilities
P [A′B ], P [A
′
BS ] are estimated. In addition, the RRF resulting
from the SIS design and verification process, RRFv is calcu-
lated. The resulting RRFv is not necessarily the same as the
desired input RRFT , and typically it is larger for a successful
SIS design cycle. The dashed box illustrates the fact that
the cyber probabilities are dependent as well on the physical
failure probability (RRF) via the combined SIS Design and
Attack Surface Identification blocks, denoting this functional
dependence by the vector valued function g(.).
If P [A′B ] and P [A
′
BS ] produce a new RRF
′ ≤ RRFv via
CLOPA, then the design is concluded and the design point is
(P [A′B ], P [A
′
BS ],RRFv). If, however, the resulting RRF
′ >
RRFv , then another iteration is required. This design process
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
One natural question about Algorithm 1 is whether there is
any convergence guarantee. To answer this question, we need
to know, or at least approximate, the function g(.). Unfortu-
nately, this is very hard in practice, as the design process is
Algorithm 1: Integrated Safety-Security Lifecycle Design
Algorithm
input : BPCS,RRFT
output: SIS,RRF, θS
[P [AB ], P [ASB ]]← BPCS-SecCycle(BPCS) ;
θB ← [P [AB ], P [ASB ] ;
P [ABS ]← Design-Contour(RRFT , P [AS ]) ;
θS ← [P [AS ], P [ABS ] ;
RRF ← RRFT ;
do
RRFv ← RRF ;
SIS ← SIS-SafeCycle(RRFv) ;
θS ← SIS-SecCycle(SIS) ;
RRF ← CLOPA(θS ;θB) ;
while RRF > RRFv;
return SIS,RRF, θS ;
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Fig. 6: Integrated Safety and Security lifecycles. The process
starts at (1) HAZOP, followed by (2) BPCS complete security
lifecycle, then (3) SIS safety lifecycle up to the design stage,
followed by (4) complete SIS security lifecycle, possibly
several iterations of steps (3) and (4), then terminates at the
SIS installation stage.
complicated, and to the best of our knowledge, no mathemati-
cal formulation has been attempted to relate these probabilities.
Without such function, the question of convergence cannot be
precisely answered. However, in practice, modifying the SIS
design to increase the RRF is usually done by changing sensor
and actuator configuration or reliability figures, as they are
often the weakest links in the reliability chain, while the logic
solver is minimally changed [5]. Accordingly, for all practical
purposes, we can assume that the design process will converge
after few runs. We consider the formulation of the dependence
between cyber attack probabilities and the SIS design process
a future research direction.
B. Integrated Safety-Security Lifecycle
As the analysis in this paper shows a clear coupling be-
tween safety and security design requirements, we propose
the integrated lifecycle in Figure 6. We present a description
of lifecycle steps, in the order of their execution.
1) Safety Lifecycle - Hazard & Risk Analysis: The first
step is to carry the hazard analysis for the plant, often using
HAZOP. This process identifies important assets that may be
subject to, or contribute to, risk scenarios. For safety design,
plant hazards could be traced back to cyber components and
the asset identification for cybersecurity is mainly based on
the Hazard analysis of the safety cycle. Therefore, this process
in the lifecycle identifies all feasible hazards and associated
risk ranking, as well as the associated cyber components for
each identified hazard. This constitutes an input to the BPCS
security lifecycle. If we designate the set of hazards by H,
and the set of cyber components by C, then the output from
this process is the function f : H 7→ R representing the risk
ranking, and the relation R ⊆ H × C representing the cyber
components for each hazard.
92) BPCS Cyber Security Lifecycle: The BPCS cybersecu-
rity lifecycle, including vulnerability analysis, attack tree gen-
eration, penetration testing, and risk assessment, is performed
on the BPCS. The output of this process is the cyber attack
probabilities P [AB ] and P [ASB ].
3) Safety Lifecycle - CLOPA and SIS Design: The first
iteration of CLOPA and SIS design will proceed according to
Algorithm 1 and Figure 5. The CLOPA calculates the design
requirement for the SIS in terms of its reliability as defined
by the RRF, and its cybersecurity resilience as defined by
P [AB ] and P [ASB ]. The SIS design then proceeds according
to IEC 61511 standard [5]. The design includes the hardware
architecture, redundancy scheme, and software architecture.
The specific design architecture can vary across industries and
organizations, but the design has to achieve the required RRF,
P [AB ] and P [ASB ], as calculated by CLOPA. After the design
is completed, SIS verification is carried out to ensure that the
proposed design achieves the required RRF. The design and
verification process is iterative until the SIS design yields the
required RRF. For a detailed discussion on SIS design and
verification, the reader is referred to [49].
4) SIS Cyber Security Lifecycle: Using the resulting SIS
design hardware and software architecture, the SIS security
lifecycle is carried out. Since the SIS system is not yet
implemented at this stage, SIS penetration testing is not
possible and hence omitted from the security lifecycle. The
output from this process is the SIS security failure probabilities
P [AS ], P [ABS ]. It is noted that the SIS security lifecycle
proceeds from right to left at the top of Figure 6 for better
presentation.
5) Safety Lifecycle - CLOPA: The CLOPA calculations are
carried out again as per algorithm 1 to verify the RRF with
the new cyber attack probabilities. The process repeats until
the termination condition RRF < RRFv is satisfied.
VI. INTEGRATED DESIGN EXAMPLE
A. CPS Description
To illustrate the integrated design lifecycle and the CLOPA,
we consider the Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR)
process illustrated in Figure 7. The reactor vessel has an inlet
stream carrying the reactant A, an outlet stream carrying the
product B, and a cooling stream carrying the cooling fluid into
the surrounding jacket to absorb the heat of the exothermic
reaction. A first order reaction takes place where a mole
fraction of reactant A is consumed to produce product B. The
outlet stream contains both reactant A and product B.
The CSTR process is controlled by the industrial control
system shown in Figure 8, which follows NIST 800-82 stan-
dard with one firewall and a DeMilitariZed (DMZ) zone [54].
The BPCS and SIS have Modbus/TCP communication over
the control network [50].
B. Integrated Lifecycle
In the following discussion, we follow the integrated life-
cycle in Figure 6, and as per the itemized discussion in
section V-B, which has a one-to-one correspondence with the
following discussion.
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Fig. 8: CPS architecture for an industrial control system
testbed, following NIST 800-82 guidelines
1) SIS Safety Lifecycle-HAZOP: We start by the safety
lifecycle, process hazard analysis. There are typically two
types of hazards for the reactor; high level causing an overflow
hazard, and high temperature that may lead to reactor runaway
and possible meltdown. Table II shows the HAZOP sheet
for the CSTR process. Each row contains: (1) the possible
hazard (for this process high level or high temperature), (2) all
possible initiating events for each hazard whether mechanical
or electronic failures, (3) consequences if the hazard occurred,
including safety, financial, and environmental losses, (4) exist-
ing safeguards that could prevent the hazard from propagating
and causing the consequences, and (5) the risk rank, which
is typically a function of the consequences. For the reactor
process, both hazards have high and very high risk rankings.
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Therefore, the two risk scenarios qualify for further LOPA
assessment.
2) BPCS Security Lifecycle: The second step is the alloca-
tion of safety layers, CLOPA. According to Figure 6, we need
to finish the BPCS security lifecycle to calculate P [AB ] and
P [ASB ]. Recall that P [AB ] is the probability that the BPCS
fails due to a direct attack. We conducted vulnerability iden-
tification on the BPCS controller and connected components,
constructed the attack tree, and carried out penetration testing
to verify the vulnerability findings. Figure 9 shows the BPCS
attack tree and Table III shows the attack tree probabilities.
The assignment of a probability measure to the success of
attack actions is subject to debate in the research community,
and there is no published agreed-upon data as in the case of
reliability failure data. One approach is to use attack databases,
such as NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [55],
to estimate the probability of cyberattack success based on
attributes such as required knowledge level and attack diffi-
culty. However, this approach has the drawback that it does
not take into account the specifics of each organization. In
this work, we rely on the experience obtained during the
penetration testing carried out by the research team to assign
the probability measures. This does not impact the analysis
as the presented case study is meant for illustration purposes
to explain the design process. In the following discussion, we
refer to edge symbols on the attack tree for easy reference.
There are two attack types to compromise the BPCS controller
and cause a process hazard; an integrity attack, represented
by the right half of the attack tree, and a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack. To launch an integrity attack, controller I/O
configuration has to be obtained, either via an insider or by
retrieval from the controller hard drive (c2, c4). In addition, the
attacker has to have either the programming tool (LabVIEW
software for this controller) (a5, a6), or the knowledge to de-
velop a low-level program to force controller outputs (a3, a4).
Finally, the attacker should have an elevated privilege access
to the controller OS (a2). To get this access, an SSH service
running on the controller is exploited via either SSH key
folder copy and password cracking or via password guessing
if no maximum password limit is set (c1, c2, c3). The DoS
attack is launched by exploiting an HTTP vulnerability in the
embedded web server used for remote controller configuration.
For the DoS to succeed, fail safe output should not have been
configured on the controller (c5).
From the attack tree and assigned edge probabilities, the
probability of BPCS direct attack could be estimated by
P [AB ] ≈ 0.033. For more information on attack trees and
their semantics, please refer to [56].
To calculate the probability of BPCS security failure given
a SIS cyber compromise P [ASB ], we construct the Modbus
vulnerability attack tree in Figure 10. To exploit the Modbus
link, a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack has to be launched
via ARP poisoning (a8). In addition, the attacker has to have
the configuration information for Modbus registers (c6), or
changes Modbus packet data randomly (a7), or utilizes non-
programmed Modbus function code for the hope that it could
crash the Modbus master (c7). Finally, the attacker has to
possess the required Modbus knowledge (a9). For the Modbus
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Fig. 10: SIS-BPCS Modbus attack tree.
attack tree edge probabilities as in Table III, it can be shown
that P [ASB ] ≈ 0.2813.
It should be noted that complete attack trees for the given
BPCS and CPS architecture could span multiple pages. How-
ever, full attack trees may obscure the analysis and will
serve no additional insight. Therefore, the simplified attack
trees presented here act as a better illustration of the design
methodology.
3) SIS Safety Lifecycle-CLOPA: We limit our discussion to
the high-level reactor hazard only. High temperature hazard
could be treated similarly. Table IV shows the LOPA sheet
for the CSTR overflow hazard identified from the HAZOP,
where the initiating event likelihoods and failure probabilities
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Hazard Initiating Event (Cause) Consequences Safeguards
(IPL)
Risk Rank
High Level (Re-
actor overflow)
BPCS failure OR Human error
(misaligned valves)
2 or more fatalities (safety), Prod-
uct loss (financial), Environmental
contamination (environment)
Reactor dike
(Mitigation)
High
High
Temperature
(Reactor Melt-
down/explosion)
BPCS failure OR Coolant inlet
control valve fully (partially)
closed OR Inlet valve stuck
fully open
10 or more fatalities (safety), Prod-
uct loss (financial), Environmental
contamination (environment)
None V. High
TABLE II: Partial HAZOP sheet for the reactor process
Attack
Sym-
bol
Description Probability
a1 Get root access on the controller 0.1
a2 Connect to BPCS on port 80 0.1
a3 Use Metasploit DoS Slowloris
Module
0.5
a4 Send HTTP request manually 0.5
a5 Obtain LabVIEW software devel-
opment License
1
a6 Training on LabVIEW software 0.5
a7 Target data changed randomly 0.125
a8 ARP Poisoning 0.5
a9 Modbus knowledge 0.5
c1 No Max password attempts config-
ured
0.1
c2 Copy SSH folder by insider at-
tacker
0.5
c3 Password guessing 0.1
c4 Exploit NFS vulnerability to add a
new SSH key
0.1
c5 Fail safe output is configured incor-
rectly
0.01
c6 Configuration data leak 0.5
c7 Modbus unknown function code
crash
0.5
TABLE III: BPCS Cyber attack probabilities
are adopted from [57], [58]. Note that human intervention is
considered a protection layer assuming there is sufficient time
for the operation team to manually isolate the reactor in the
field. Some conservative approaches omit any human inter-
vention or safety procedure from the LOPA. From the LOPA
sheet, we obtain Σ3i=1λi = 0.3, P [L] = 0.001, λb = 0.01,
λc = 0.01, and P [Bp] = 0.01. Substituting these values, along
with the probability values P [AB ] = 0.033, P [ASB ] = 0.2813
calculated from the BPCS security lifecycle, in equations (8) -
(10) and (13) - (15), we obtain the LOPA parameters in Table
V.
Using the calculated LOPA parameter values, the design
Fig. 11: CSTR Case Study: CLOPA design region with contour
plot for the Risk Reduction Factor (RRF).
region (17) and boundary (18) are defined by:
P [ABS ] ≤ 0.132
(
1− 148.68P [AS ]
1− P [AS ]
)
(26)
where the design boundary is defined when the equality holds.
The contour lines for the RRF in (19) are defined by:
P [ABS ] =
(
15.42
C − 1
)(
(C − 0.008)− (C − 1.27)P [AS ]
1− P [AS ]
)
(27)
for different values C of the RRF. The design region as well
as the contour lines are plotted in Figure 11. The minimum
RRF achievable for a perfectly secured safety system is 126.
We note that as we approach the design boundary, either by
increasing P [AS ] or P [ABS ], the RRF rapidly increases such
that it is not possible to plot the contour lines in this region
in a visible way. The design in this region is very sensitive to
input variations (i.e., a very small variation in probabilities will
results in a very large change in RRF). Therefore, the design
point should be selected as far as possible from the design
boundary. To further illustrate the increase in RRF, Figure 12
is a 3D plot for the RRF as it varies with both P [AS ] and
P [ABS ]. It should be evident from the 3D plot that for small
values of P [AS ], The function gradient is smaller, resulting
in a less-sensitive design to probability variations. At larger
values of P [AS ] near the design boundary, the RRF increases
exponentially with P [ABS ]. These results could be verified by
calculating the gradient of (12).
To proceed with the design process, we pick the point
P [AS ] = 0.003 as a reasonable probability value for SIS
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Initiating Event Likelihood λi (/yr) Tank Dike Safety
Procedure
Human Inter-
vention
BPCS
(P [Bp])
TMEL
Inlet flow surge 10−1 10−2 1 10−1 10−1 10−6
Downstream flow blockage 10−1 10−2 10−1 10−1 10−1 10−6
Manual valves misalignment 10−1 10−2 10−1 10−1 10−1 10−6
BPCS physical Failure 10−1(λb) 10−2 1 10−1 1 10−6
BPCS attack Failure 10−2(λc) 10−2 1 10−1 1 10−6
TABLE IV: LOPA sheet for the CSTR overflow hazardous scenario. Numbers in each cell represent the probability of failure
of the associated protection layer
LOPA Parameter Value
α1 1.13× 10−4
α2 1.17× 10−4
β 10−6
γ1 1.4868×10−4
γ2 7.5785×10−6
γ3 1.1686×10−4
TABLE V: CSTR CLOPA - Calculated parameter values
Fig. 12: CLOPA RRF as it varies with SIS security failure
probabilities. Steepest ascent region to the right should be
avoided when selecting the operating point.
direct attack failure that is away from the steepest ascent
region in figure 12. We now need to choose a practical value
of P [ABS ] that results in an achievable target RRF. With
the help of Figure 11 and contour lines, P [AS ] = 0.003
intersects the contour line for RRF = 500 at P [ABS ] = 0.0426.
Alternatively, the value of P [ABS ] could be obtained from
(27) by setting C = 500 and P [AS ] = 0.003. The design
point (0.003, 0.0426, 500) is indicated in Figure 11 and 12.
The design and verification of the SIS then resumes according
to IEC 61511 to develop an embedded system architecture
that satisfies the combined CLOPA requirement: RRF ≥ 500,
P [AS ] ≤ 0.003, and P [ABS ] ≤ 0.0426. The SIS design
and verification steps repeat iteratively until the proposed
architecture satisfies the requirement.
4) SIS Cyber Security Lifecycle: The resulting SIS archi-
tecture is used to carry out the security lifecycle, similar to the
BPCS security risk assessment in step 2 of the design process.
As the SIS detailed design and verification is not in the scope
of the paper, we will assume for the sake of illustration that
the SIS design results in a cyber system configuration that has
probability measures P ′[AS ] = 0.005 and P ′[ABS ] = 0.02
as calculated from the security risk assessment process, which
are different from the original CLOPA probability values that
were used to calculate the required RRF.
5) Safety Lifecycle - CLOPA: The CLOPA calculations are
carried out again as per (12) to calculate the updated RRF
requirement using the new security failure probability values
resulting from the SIS security lifecycle. With P ′[AS ] = 0.005
and P ′[ABS ] = 0.02, we obtain RRF = 1098. This is clearly
a greater reliability requirement than the value RRFv = 500
achieved by the original SIS design. Therefore, the design
steps 3) and 4) will be repeated until the resulting RRF <
RRFv (refer to algorithm 1 ). In practice, subsequent iterations
of the design process will harden the security aspects of the
SIS to achieve the target probabilities rather than changing
the system architecture to achieve a new risk reduction factor.
This is mainly because the design of the SIS involves multiple
aspects such as the redundancy scheme and reliability of
individual sensor and actuator components that may not be
easy to alter compared to tightening security measures for the
specified hardware and software architecture.
C. Classical LOPA Error
Classical LOPA ignores cyber attack probabilities alto-
gether. For the given problem, it results in RRF = 113 as
per (16). The minimum CLOPA RRF occurs for a perfectly
secured safety system where P [AS ] = P [ABS ] = 0, achieving
RRF = 117. Therefore, the minimum error between LOPA
and CLOPA RRF estimation is 4. The error gets worse as
cyber attack probabilities increase. For the given design point
P [AS ], P [ABS ] = (0.003, 0.0426), the classical LOPA error
is eRRF = 378. This is a significant amount of error that
results in the design of a less reliable system that will not
achieve the target risk level. Figure 13 better illustrates the
error increase with increasing the cyber attack probability
P [ABS ] for different values of P [AS ]. For small values of
P [AS ], the curves show slow increase in RRF with P [ABS ].
As P [AS ] increases, the RRF increase becomes exponential.
A similar contour figure for fixed P [ABS ] values could be
generated. The design point for the case study P [AS ] = 0.003
was chosen as a tradeoff between an achievable cyber attack
probability value and a moderate rate of increase for the RRF.
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Fig. 13: Increase of RRF with P [ABS ]. Each curve corre-
sponds to the fixed value indicated for P [AS ]
D. Discussion on Likelihood of Cyber Attacks
In the model derivation, we use the parameter λc to repre-
sent the expected number of successful cyberattacks per fixed
time interval. This parameter is essential when considering the
security failure as an initiating cause, as it allows us to express
the frequency of cyber attack attempts, and hence estimate the
overall probability of a system hazard as a consequence of the
cyber attack. However, a counter argument is that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to estimate λc. To help with the
discussion, we further dissect the contribution to λc with the
aid of Figure 8 that shows the interconnection between the
corporate LAN, the control LAN, and the DMZ. There are
four contributions to the overall frequency of a cyber attack:
(1) Outside attacker over the internet, with expected number of
cyberattacks λc1 , and probability of success to penetrate to the
control LAN Pc1 , (2) Inside attacker from the corporate LAN,
with λc2 and Pc2 , (3) Inside attacker from the DMZ, with
λc3 and Pc3 , and (4) Inside attacker from the control LAN,
with λc4 and Pc4 = 1. The resulting total expected number of
cyberattacks is given by:
λc =
4∑
i=1
λciPci (28)
The quantities λc2 , λc3 , and λc4 could be estimated from the
number of employees who have access to each level of the
network and their working hours. A conservative approach is
to consider all employees, but this results in an unnecessarily
over-design. The parameter λc1 for outside attacker, though,
is a challenge. It is not possible to estimate accurately the
attack rate from different places all over the world. However,
a probability distribution could be used with parameters that
represent relevant factors for the CPS and the outside world
environment. Example CPS parameters are whether the organi-
zation is governmental or private, and whether the corporation
is well-known to the public so that it could be targeted,
or just a low-profile corporation. Parameters related to the
world environment may include whether the country where the
corporation is located is currently exhibiting a rise in attack
attempts. Obviously, such probability distribution to profile
the attacker is time-varying. Finally, for design engineers who
are reluctant to specify values for the expected number of
attacks, a sensitivity analysis may be useful to demonstrate
the dependence of the results on this parameter.
VII. CONCLUSION
Classical safety assessment methods do not take into ac-
count failures due to cyberattacks. In this paper, we showed
quantitatively that overlooking security failures could bias
the risk assessment, resulting in under-designed protective
systems. In addition, the design of safety and security subsys-
tems for complex engineering systems cannot be carried out
independently, given their strong coupling as demonstrated in
this paper. Although the design becomes more complicated
when considering cyberattacks, the development of software
tools or the modification of existing industrial tools could
automate the process.
Several research directions were identified during the course
of our research work presented in this paper. First, the au-
tomation of the safety and security lifecycles, including their
integration, is an important practical aspect of the research.
Second, as model-based design became the defacto standard
to design complex engineering systems, the integration of both
the safety and security lifecycles into the model-based design
process is crucial for adoption by industry. Important questions
here are: how to define safety and security requirements
at early stages, how these requirements impact the system
design, and how to verify such requirements in the framework
of model-based design. Third, we considered in this work
how cybersecurity parameters could impact safety design.
The reverse question is also important; how safety properties
could impact security design. Although we provided a partial
answer to this question in Figure 5, the idea is abstract and
requires more in-depth treatment with practical examples and
methods of integration. Finally, we answered in this paper
the question of how reliable our safety system should be
in order to achieve the target risk level in the presence of
security failures. However, this reliability level may be hard to
achieve, or economically not feasible. Optimal system design
that captures possible safety and security design choices with
associated financial cost is an important research problem.
SOURCE CODE
The source code for the CLOPA in the form of Matlab m
files to regenerate the research results including the case study
are located at https://github.com/Ashraf-Tantawy/CLOPA.git
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Symbol Description Type
λi Initiating event i likelihood (/yr) Parameter
λp BPCS physical failure event likeli-
hood (/yr)
Parameter
λc BPCS security failure event likeli-
hood (/yr)
Parameter
P [Li] Probability of failure of all protec-
tion layers for initiating event i
Parameter
TMEL Target Mitigated Event Likelihood Parameter
P [Bc] Probability of BPCS security fail-
ure
Intermediate
design
variable
P [Bp] Probability of BPCS physical fail-
ure
Parameter
P [AB ] Probability of BPCS direct security
failure
Parameter
P [ASB ] Probability of BPCS SIS-pivot se-
curity failure
Parameter
P [Sc] Probability of SIS security failure Intermediate
design
variable
P [Sp] Probability of SIS physical failure Design
variable
P [AS ] Probability of SIS direct security
failure
Design
variable
P [ABS ] Probability of SIS BPCS-pivot se-
curity failure
Design
variable
P [Sc, Bc]Probability of simultaneous SIS
and BPCS security failure
Intermediate
design
variable
α1 −
α2
- Auxiliary
parame-
ters
γ1−γ3 - Auxiliary
parame-
ters
ζ1− ζ3 - Auxiliary
parame-
ters
β - Auxiliary
parame-
ters
TABLE VI: CLOPA model parameters. Variables designated
as ”Design variable” are with respect to CLOPA, but could be a
design variable of another assessment, such as P [AB ], derived
from BPCS security risk assessment. Variables designated as
”Intermediate design variables” could be expressed in terms
of design variables.
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